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  I  
INTRODUCTION 
Israel’s organ-transplantation history dates back to 1964, when the first 
kidney transplantation from a living related donor was performed.1 In 1965, the 
first kidney transplantation from a deceased donor was successfully 
accomplished.2 Currently six Israeli medical centers perform kidney, heart, lung, 
and liver transplantations.3 The Israel National Transplant Center (INTC) 
coordinates all donors and transplantations.4 INTC coordinators are in every 
medical center in the country.5 Despite this, the deceased-organ-donation rate 
in Israel has traditionally been among the lowest in Western countries, ranging 
between seven and eight deceased donors per million population.6 
There are numerous past and present causes of the low donation rate. One 
major cause is the refusal of some ultraorthodox religious groups to recognize 
brain death as a valid determination of death.7 These groups may refuse organ 
donation from individuals who are brain dead but do not meet other criteria.8 
Many mainstream rabbis accept brain death as a valid determination of death 
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 1.  ISR. NAT’L TRANSPLANT CENTER, http://www.health.gov.il/Subjects/Organ_transplant/ 
Israel_transplant_center_ADI/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Council of Europe, International Figures on Organ Donation and Transplantation Activity—
2010, NEWSLETTER TRANSPLANT, Sept. 2011, at 35, available at http://www.edqm.eu/ 
medias/fichiers/Newsletter_Transplant_Vol_16_No_1_Sept_2011.pdf.  
 7.  Jonathan Cohen et al., Brain Death Determination in Israel: The First Two Years Experience 
Following Changes to the Brain Death Law—Opportunities and Challenges, 12 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANTATION 2514, 2514 (2012). 
 8.  Id. 
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and consider organ donation one of the highly noble deeds in Judaism.9 
However, the vocal objection from ultraorthodox rabbis has widespread 
consequences since, during critical moments of life, many Israelis, mainly 
religious but also secular, seek comfort and advice from various religious 
leaders and tend to accept their judgment.10 
An additional cause of the low donation rate is the so-called “free-riding” 
behavior of those who reject brain death as a valid determination of death yet 
are prepared to be organ recipients from brain-dead donors.11 This phenomenon 
spurs resentment to organ donation and is cited in Israeli public-opinion surveys 
as a major reason for the low consent rate.12 
Another important cause was, until recently, the relatively inexpensive 
availability of transplant tourism for Israeli patients. The Ministry of Health 
allows Israeli hospitals to perform kidney transplants only from either living 
related or purely altruistic non-designated donors, following approval by special 
national transplant ethics committees.13 Candidates for kidney transplantation 
who identify fellow Israelis who are willing to sell one of their kidneys are 
prohibited from undergoing surgery in Israel.14 Accordingly, instead, many of 
them used to travel with their donors to countries such as Turkey, South Africa, 
Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, or Sri Lanka for the surgery.15 In the majority of cases, 
Israeli transplant tourists received kidneys from foreign paid donors in the 
donors’ home countries—mainly the Philippines, but also China and 
Colombia.16 Due to a lack of meaningful legal obstacles up to the year 2008, 
Israeli insurance companies and sick funds used to incentivize this transplant 
tourism by fully reimbursing transplant operations performed abroad regardless 
of the legality of the operations under local law.17 These reimbursements were 
motivated by both the desire to help desperate patients overcome the local 
organ shortage and considerations of economic efficiency as these patients were 
taken off the costly dialysis list.18 Moreover, middlemen, who were motivated to 
expand the transplant tourism market, have emerged between the donors and 
the insurance companies or sick funds, thereby exacerbating the problem.19 
Finally, altruistic organ donation was also traditionally underutilized due to 
a variety of disincentives, mainly involving lack of any reimbursement to live 
 
 9.  ISRAEL NATIONAL TRANSPLANT CENTER, supra note 1. 
 10.  Cohen et al., supra note 7, at 2515–17.  
 11.  Stephanie Eaton, The Subtle Politics of Organ Donation: A Proposal, 24 J. MED. ETHICS 167, 
167–68 (1998).  
 12.  Jacob Lavee et al., A New Law for Allocation of Donor Organs in Israel, 375 LANCET 1131, 
1131 (2010) [hereinafter Lavee, New Law]. 
 13.  Benita Padilla et al., Impact of Legal Measures Prevent Transplant Tourism: The Interrelated 
Experience of The Philippines and Israel. 16 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 915, 916 (2013).  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. 
11_LAVEE_STOLER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014 4:05 PM 
No. 3 2014] RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM 325 
donors for their incurred expenses and loss of income 
In response to all of these obstacles to organ transplantation, on March 31, 
2008 the Israeli Parliament passed into legislation two laws relevant to organ 
transplantation.20 The laws aim to halt illegal transplant tourism while increasing 
local organ donation from both deceased and living donors. They are designed 
to increase consent rates for both deceased and live donation by cutting off 
transplant tourism, incentivizing registration for deceased donation, and 
removing disincentives for live donation. This review summarizes the unique 
aspects of these laws and their preliminary impact in 2011. 
II 
A REVIEW OF RECENT ISRAELI LAWS RELATED TO ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION 
A. The Brain-Respiratory Death Law 
The first of these two laws, the Brain-Respiratory Death Law,21 represents a 
consensus between the medical community and the religious authorities. It 
defines the circumstances and mechanisms for determining brain death.22 These 
include: 
1. The mandatory performance of an apnea test according to established 
guidelines, including the use of a continuous positive airway pressure system 
where appropriate; 
2. The mandatory performance of an ancillary test, using one of the 
following modalities: transcranial Doppler; computed, tomographic 
angiography; or auditory, brainstem-evoked potentials. Radionuclide 
angiography, using hexamethylpropylene amine oxime single-photon emission 
CT (SPECT), was included as an option for ancillary testing in 2011;23 
3. Informing next of kin when a patient is suspected of being brain-
respiratory dead and inquiring whether the patient expressed an opinion, in 
writing, regarding the determination of brain death. The provision requires that 
these views be taken into consideration before performing formal brain-death 
testing;24 
4. The establishment of an accreditation committee, comprising ten 
members, including four physicians from various disciplines, three rabbis (one 
 
 20. Brain-Repository Death Law, 5768-2008, SH No. 2144 (Isr.), available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2144/2144.pdf; The Organ Transplantation Law 5768-2008. SH 
No. 2144 p. 394 (Isr.), available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2144/2144.pdf, translated in 
Israel Transplant Law: Organ Transplant Act, 2008, The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking 
and Transplant Tourism (April 8, 2014, 2:29 PM), http://www.declarationofistanbul.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=267:israel-transplant-law-organ-transplant-act-
2008&catid=83:legislation&Itemid=130. 
 21.  Brain-Repository Death Law at p. 406 (Isr.).  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 406, 408. 
 24.  Id. at 407. 
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of them also a physician), an ethicist, a philosopher, and a lawyer;25 
5. The requirement for all physicians determining brain-respiratory death to 
undergo a training course, the content of which is determined by the 
accreditation committee.26 
In addition, when a patient makes his position against the determination of 
brain death known to his relatives, he will not be disconnected from the 
mechanical ventilator until his heart stops beating.27 All other therapy will be 
discontinued.28 
B. The Organ Transplantation Law 
The second of these two laws, the Organ Transplantation Law,29 
comprehensively defines all ethical, legal, and organizational aspects of organ 
donation, allocation, and transplantation in Israel. First, the law declares 
buying, selling, or brokering in organs a criminal offence punishable by three 
years in jail and subject to a large fine, whether performed within or outside of 
Israel.30 It also bans reimbursement for organ transplantation anywhere outside 
of Israel if the procurement of the organ and its transplantation are performed 
contrary to the law of either that country or Israel, rendering the law 
extraterritorial.31 
A clause in the law gives priority to potential organ recipients who (1) are 
registered as organ donors for at least three years prior to being listed as 
candidates, (2) gave their consent for actual organ donation of their deceased 
next-of-kin, or (3) are non-designated living kidney or liver-lobe donors.32 A 
recent Parliamentary amendment gives priority to all living donors, non-
designated and designated alike, broadening the clause’s scope.33 
Finally, the law includes the following clauses that aim to remove 
disincentives to living donation: 
1. Fixed reimbursement equivalent to forty days of lost wages based on the 
donor’s average income during the three months prior to donation (an 
unemployed donor is reimbursed based upon the minimum salary in the market 
at the time of donation);34 
 
 25.  Id. at 407.  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 408. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  The Organ Transplantation Law at p. 394 (Isr.). 
 30.  Id. at 404. 
 31.  Id. at 395. 
 32.  Id. at 396–97, 402. 
 33.  GUIDELINES FOR ORGAN ALLOCATION OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE ISR. NAT’L 
TRANSPLANT CENTER BASED UPON THE ORGAN TRANSPLANT LAW, 3286 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/EF3D9055-295C-4152-89C3-ADADBCC0C5D8/26789/6216.pdf.  
 34.  Rules for Reimbursements of Live Organ Donors, ISRAELI MINISTER OF HEALTH (based upon 
the Organ Transplantation Law), http://www.nevo.co.il/law_html_/Law06/tak-6917.pdf, at 1468 (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
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2. Reimbursement for travel expenses to and from the hospital for the donor 
and his relatives during the entire hospitalization and follow-up period;35 
3. Reimbursement for seven days of recovery in a recuperation facility 
within three months after donation;36 
4. Five years reimbursement for medical insurance, work-capability-loss 
insurance, and life insurance, all to be reimbursed upon submission of 
appropriate insurance policies and payment receipts; and37 
5. Reimbursement of five psychological consultations and treatments upon 
submission of appropriate receipts.38 
Banning reimbursement for illegal transplant tourism went into effect in late 
2008 shortly after this new law was passed. It took two more years for the INTC 
to promulgate and implement the multitude of regulations stemming from these 
two laws.39 Following an intensive year-long multilingual media campaign in 
2011,40 the new laws were fully implemented in April 2012.41 
III 
THE GOALS OF THE RECENT ISRAELI LAWS RELATED TO ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION 
A. Increasing Consent Rate for Deceased Organ Donation by Resurrecting 
the Reciprocal Altruism Principle 
Organ donation in Israel has always been an opt-in model requiring the 
donor’s explicit consent.42 The deceased’s relatives’ consent is always obtained 
prior to organ procurement.43 Traditionally, signed donor cards were 
interpreted as representing the donor’s written will, and therefore were almost 
uniformly respected by relatives.44 The Organ Transplantation Law assumes 
that donors’ next of kin will continue to honor that consent and therefore the 
more individuals will opt in because of the priority given to registered donors, 
the higher the number will be of actual consents for deceased organ donation. 
The law provides an incentive for individuals to agree to help each other. 
This incentive structure resembles naturally occurring “reciprocal altruism,” 
 
 35.  Id. at 1469. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 1468. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 1468–69; see supra note 33, at 3286. 
 40.  See, e.g., NAT’L TRANSPLANT CENTER, http://www.itc.gov.il/eng/index.html (last visited May 
10, 2013). 
 41.  2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ISR. NAT’L TRANSPLANT CENTER, http://www.itc.gov.il/ 
news/news-06022013.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
 42.  ISR, NAT’L TRANSPLANT CENTER, http://www.itc.gov.il/eng/merkaz.html (last visited Apr. 16, 
2014). 
 43.  Id. 
 44. Lavee, New Law, supra note 12, at 1131.  
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defined by Trivers as “each partner helping the other while he helps himself.”45 
The altruist donor benefits because, in time, he “is helped in turn.”46 
Interestingly, Wilson and Wilson noted that “internally altruistic groups out-
compete selfish groups.”47 
The preliminary results show that the number of new registered donors per 
month has significantly risen from a mean of 2889, from 1998–2010, to a 
monthly mean of 6273 in 2011.48 This represents an increase in the total number 
of registered donors from 10% of the adult population in 2010 to 12% in 2011 
(95% confidence interval for the difference between the means 1113–5654, p = 
0.007).49 The consent rate for organ donation from deceased donors increased to 
54.9% in 2011 from 49.2% in 2010, although this increase is not statistically 
significant (95% prediction interval 38.7–56.8, p = 0.11).50 However, the number 
of deceased organ donors significantly increased from 60 in 2010 to 89 in 2011.51 
This is also a significant increase in comparison to the previous seven years.52 
Consequently, there is a significant increase in the deceased-organ-donation 
rate, from 7.8 donors per million population in 2010 to 11.4 in 2011.53 
One question that, naturally, arises is whether statistical analysis and testing 
is required at all for our data. After all, we have the full national population of 
families asked to donate their loved ones’ organs after the declaration of brain 
death. A simple comparison of consent rates between years might seem enough 
to prove whether the consent rate has increased from 2010 to 2011. However, 
we feel that this would be a narrow interpretation of the data. To formulate a 
successful policy, we need to know whether the new law is expected to increase 
the consent rate in the future. Although we know that the consent rate 
increased from 2010 to 2011, we cannot necessarily extrapolate and make 
predictions about the future, an essential concession when evaluating public 
policy. We therefore prefer to view our data as a sample and not the full 
population. The relevant period of consideration extends into the future, and, 
every year, a certain value for the consent rate is realized based on a certain 
statistical distribution. What we are interested in (and testing for using the 
prediction-interval method) is whether that statistical distribution changes in 
2011. If the probability of donation when a request is made is unchanged by the 
law, then the law is not expected to bring any benefits, and the increase in 2011 
 
 45.  Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 39 (1971). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  David Sloan Wilson & Edward O. Wilson, Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of 
Sociobiology, 82 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 327, 328 (2007). 
 48.  Jacob Lavee et al., Preliminary Marked Increase in the National Organ Donation Rate in Israel 
Following Implementation of a New Organ Transplantation Law, 13 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 780, 
781 (2013) [hereinafter Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase].  
 49.  Id.; see infra Figure 1.  
 50.  Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 64, at 782; see infra Figure 1.  
 51.  Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 64, at 781.  
 52.  Id; see infra Figure 2A.  
 53.  Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 64, at 781; see infra Figure 2B.  
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could be a statistical accident. 
As mentioned, the new law was enacted on March 2008,54 but the new 
organ-allocation prioritization plan was not implemented until April 2012,55 and 
therefore the increase observed in 2011 could be attributed to the year-long 
public campaign that preceded it.56 It may be too early to attribute these 
encouraging results to the prioritization policy. We expect, however, that once 
the results are more widely publicized and understood by the public, the 
consent rate will increase. As outlined in part IV of this article, we will continue 
to monitor the effects of the new law. 
The new prioritization policy is not purely altruistic because there is a quid 
pro quo reward. Moreover, it violates the ideal of medical care being allocated 
on the basis of medical need only, not other factors such as a patient’s ethnic 
origin, wealth, or behavior. However, most people who sign an organ donor 
card will never need an organ themselves, nor will they receive a material 
reward for their promised donation. Therefore, they may not be purely 
altruistic, but they remain predominantly altruistic.57 
Is it unfair to those “free riders” to prioritize other candidates who are 
willing to donate over them? We hypothesize that true believers in the 
immorality of organ donation after brain death would not be affected by the 
new law. If organ donation after brain death is morally wrong, then it is morally 
wrong for their potential organ recipients as well. Therefore, it would be 
morally wrong for them to become candidates for organ transplantation and to 
accept an organ. Respecting the religious freedom of those who become 
candidates requires respecting their refusal to donate after death. But it does 
not require giving them the same priority as those who are willing to donate. 
They are still eligible for transplants, if needed, despite the “free riding” that 
this entails, simply on the basis of their medical need and medicine’s 
commitment to meeting patients’ needs. Moreover, if they were to be willing to 
donate an organ while alive, to which they would have no objection, they would 
be granted a level of priority in organ allocation equal to those who gave their 
actual consent for the donation of the organs of their deceased next of kin. In 
addition, if this new policy achieves the goal and produces sufficiently more 
organs, everyone benefits. People who do not sign a donor card, although 
disadvantaged, are better off than they would be without the policy.58 
The original version of the law was criticized59 for granting priority in organ 
 
 54.  The Organ Transplantation Law 5768-2008. SH No. 2144 p. 394 (Isr.), available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2144/2144.pdf (accessed May 10, 2013). 
 55.  2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ISR. NAT’L TRANSPLANT CENTER, supra note 53. 
 56.  See infra Figure 1.  
 57.  See generally, Jacob Lavee & Dan Brock, Prioritizing Registered Donors in Organ Allocation: 
An Ethical Appraisal of the Israeli Organ Transplant Law, 18 CURRENT OPINION CRITICAL CARE 707 
(2012) [hereinafter Lavee, Prioritizing Registered Donors]. 
 58.  Id. at 709. 
 59.  Muireann Quigley et al., Organ Donation and Priority Points in Israel: An Ethical Analysis, 93 
TRANSPLANTATION 970, 972 (2012).  
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allocation to candidates who had previously donated an organ only to a non-
designated recipient, the so-called fully altruistic live-organ donation.60 
Parliament’s decision assumed that non-designated donation is substantially 
more altruistic than designated donation to a relative or friend. However, as 
designated living donors become an increasingly large source of organs, they 
support the goal of increasing the organ supply and therefore deserve to be 
prioritized.61 In opposition with this version, a special advisory committee 
recommended giving priority to all living donors.62 The Israeli Parliament 
recently amended this clause to grant priority to all living donors, both 
designated and non-designated.63 
For years, the United Network for Organ Sharing has practiced a similar 
policy, which gives all living donors priority to receive a transplant from a 
deceased donor should they ever need one.64 A similar provision exists in the 
organ-transplantation law in Singapore, in which any candidate for organ 
transplantation who does not opt out of organ donation prior to being listed is 
prioritized over candidates who opt out.65 
Kessler and Roth’s recent research strongly supports the prioritization 
policy.66 Through a a laboratory experimental game, which examines how 
various management strategies for organ-donation waiting lists impact the 
process of deciding to register as an organ donor, they show that an organ-
allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who have previously 
registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.67 
Kessler and Roth also find that the existence of a legal loophole completely 
eliminates the increase in donation generated by the priority rule.68 Through the 
loophole, an individual can register to receive priority but avoid donating by 
providing his family with the option to decline donation.69 We share this concern 
and will monitor it carefully by comparing the consent rate of families in which 
the deceased has a donor card to the consent rate of families in which the 
deceased has no donor card. The weighted average consent rate for people who 
signed a card for 2002–2010 was 90.4%,70 whereas the weighted average consent 
 
 60.  The Organ Transplantation Law 5768-2008. SH No. 2144 p. 396-397, 402 (Isr.), available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2144/2144.pdf (accessed May 10, 2013). 
 61.  Lavee, Prioritizing Registered Donors, supra note 57, at 710.  
 62.  Lavee, New Law, supra note 12, at 1131. 
 63.  Jacob Lavee, Ethical Amendments to the Israeli Organ Transplant Law, 13 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANTATION 1614, 1614 (2013).  
 64.  UNOS Policy 3.5.5.3: allocation of deceased kidneys (2008).  
 65.  Human Organ Transplant Act (Ch. 131A, § 12(a)–(b) (Indon.).  
 66.  Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate, 102 
AM. ECON. REV. 2018, 2021 (2012). 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, Organ Donation Loopholes Undermine Warm Glow Giving: 
An Experiment Motivated By Priority Loopholes in Israel, 21–22 (Feb. 23, 2013) (working paper), 
available at http://www.gsm.pku.edu.cn/resource/uploadfiles/docs/20130313/201303131229496395.docx . 
 69.  Id. at 4–6.  
 70.  Unpublished internal data of the Israel National Transplant Center. 
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rate for people who did not sign a card was 42%.71 In 2011, these consent rates 
were 93% and 51%, respectively,72 so we see no signs of any decline. As data 
accumulates, we will employ more rigorous statistical testing, and if adjustments 
to the law need to be made, we will raise the issue with the relevant authorities. 
Even if the prioritization approach results in higher consent rates, public 
opposition is a relevant concern for the United States and other countries 
considering implementing a similar policy. Robertson, Yokum, and Wright 
report in this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems73 that, in experimental 
settings, most U.S. study participants consider the reciprocal preferences 
proposal efficacious in achieving a significant increase in organ donation yet of 
low morality. However, a set group of policy reforms, which combine reciprocal 
preferences, opt-out schemes, and elimination of the family veto, neutralize 
moral objections to a policy that consists only of reciprocal preferences, which 
suggests that this package of reforms may be politically feasible. 
B. Stopping Transplant Tourism by Banning Reimbursement 
The annual number of patients undergoing kidney transplantation abroad 
has decreased from 155 in 2006 to thirty-five in 2011, based on data retrieved 
from the Israeli National Dialysis Registry.74 This is likely due to the ban on 
reimbursing patients for transplantations that are illegal in the host country. 
Transplant tourism to traditional illegal venues, such as China, with its mostly 
executed prisoner donors, and the Philippines, with its vendor living donors, has 
stopped completely since the new law took effect.75 A few patients self-funded 
their kidney transplantations performed abroad during 2011, but most Israeli 
patients do not seek transplantation abroad if it is not reimbursed.76 Although 
pre-dialytic patients seeking illegal kidney transplantations abroad might not be 
registered with the Israeli National Dialysis Registry, all Israeli dialytic patients 
must register, and therefore, their transplantation is always documented 
regardless of where it is performed. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the 
significant reduction in observed kidney transplantations abroad is not 
artificially high by failing to account for a significant increase in illegal, self-
funded transplant tourism. 
C. Increasing Live Kidney Donation by Removing Disincentives 
In parallel to the significant decrease in transplant tourism from Israel, local 
living kidney donation has significantly increased from seventy-one in 2010 to 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Christopher T. Robertson et al., Perceptions of Efficacy, Morality, and Politics of Potential 
Cadaveric Organ Transplantation Reforms. 77 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 101. 
 74.  Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 48, at 782; see infra Figure 3A.  
 75.  See, e.g., Padilla et al., supra note 13. 
 76.  See Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 48, at 782. 
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117 in 2011.77 It is hard to ascertain whether this is the result of the dwindling 
opportunities to receive a kidney abroad or due to the removal of disincentives 
for local living donation. Regardless, the end result is a marked increase in the 
number of living kidney donations. 
Overall, the significant increase in 2011 in organ transplantations, both from 
deceased and living donors, has resulted, for the first time in a decade, in a 
decrease in the number of candidates awaiting organ transplantation and the 
number of potential recipients who die on the waiting list.78 
D. The Declaration of Istanbul and the Self Sufficiency Goal 
The Israeli Parliament approved the new Israeli Organ Transplantation Law 
one month before representatives from seventy-eight countries around the 
world formalized the Declaration of Istanbul.79 However, it follows the 
Declaration’s principles almost verbatim. The fundamental goal of the 
Declaration is that each nation should “strive to achieve self-sufficiency in 
organ donation by providing a sufficient number of organs for residents in need 
from within the country.”80 Banning reimbursement for illegal transplant 
tourism, combined with the other measures aimed at increasing local deceased 
and living donation, is a signal of success. It also addresses the recent call for 
governments’ self-sufficiency in organ donation and transplantation.81 
IV 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although the 2011 increase in organ donations in Israel is encouraging, the 
results are still preliminary and more work needs to be done to better evaluate 
the long-term implications of the new law. We will undertake the following 
additional research projects. 
First, we will keep collecting data and reevaluate annually whether the 
increase in organ donations in 2011 was temporary or permanent. 
Second, a more thorough analysis of the reasons behind the 2011 increase in 
organ donation may be useful. Organ donations may have increased for many 
reasons, such as an increase in the supply of potential donors, an increase in the 
consent rate as a result of the public campaign, or as a result of the incentives 
offered by the new law. 
Third, a subject of critical importance to the successful implementation of 
 
 77.  Lavee, Preliminary Marked Increase, supra note 48, at 782; see Figure 3B.  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism and Commercialism: The Declaration of Istanbul, 
LANCET, Jul. 5, 2008, at 5; the Organ Transplantation Law 5768-2008. SH No. 2144 p. 394 (Isr.), 
available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law/2144/2144.pdf (accessed May 10, 2013). 
 80.  Principles, DECLARATION OF ISTANBUL ON ORGAN TRAFFICKING AND TRANSPLANT 
TOURISM, http://www.declarationofistanbul.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article& 
id=82&Itemid=86 (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).  
 81.  See, e.g., Francis L. Delmonico et al., A Call for Government Accountability to Achieve 
National Self-sufficiency in Organ Donation and Transplantation, 378 LANCET 1414, 1417 (2011).  
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similar programs is whether they constitute a Pareto improvement,82 or whether 
people who do not sign a donor card are worse off because of the program. 
Clearly, people who have a donor card are better off because there are more 
organs to be allocated and they have higher priority than before signing. On the 
other hand, people who do not have a donor card gain from the increased 
supply of organs, but may be worse off overall if the effect of having lower 
priority on the waiting list outweighs the benefits of the higher organ supplies. 
We will observe the outcomes of candidates for organ transplantation with and 
without donor cards before and after the implementation of the law. In 
addition, we will analyze the issue of the optimal prioritization scheme. On the 
one hand, prioritization needs to be substantial enough to cause an increased 
number of signatures. On the other hand, it also needs to prevent a significant 
increase in mortality rates of candidates on the waiting lists who have not signed 
the donor card. 
Finally, analyzing different countries can be useful to predict whether 
similar programs may be effective in other countries, like the United States. 
Israel is somewhat unique because it contains groups who are strongly against 
organ donation and not likely to respond to incentives. Similar programs may 
be more effective elsewhere. On the other hand, the higher percentage of 
donor-card signers in other countries and the higher consent rate suggest that 
there is less room for improvement in other countries, limiting the potential 
response to the program. Such factors need to be carefully examined, 
potentially with public-opinion surveys. 
V 
SUMMARY 
Changing national attitudes toward organ donation is daunting and time-
consuming. The two new Israeli laws were created in response to various 
obstacles to organ donation. The early results appear promising and suggest the 
measures were effective. Time will tell whether the organ donation rate in Israel 
will increase enough to deal with the increasing number of candidates for organ 
transplantation. Meanwhile, applying these policy measures more universally 
may be considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 82.  Pareto efficiency is a term commonly used in economics. It means that it is not possible to 
improve the situation of one person without hurting someone else. A Pareto improvement is an action 
that improves the situation of someone without hurting somebody else. The advantage in focusing on 
Pareto efficiency is that no one should object to actions that constitute a Pareto improvement, although 
comparisons between different Pareto-efficient allocations necessarily involve weighing the utility of 
certain individuals against others (because, if the economy is at a Pareto-efficient point, moving it to 
another point will make some individuals better off but hurt others).  
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Figure 1: Cumulative number of registered donors by the end of each and the 
annual consent rate for deceased organ donation (in percent).11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
A. Annual number of deceased organ donors.11 
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B. Annual deceased organ donation rate (pmp – per million population).11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
A. Annual number of kidney transplantations performed abroad.11 
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B. Annual number of kidney transplantations from living donors.11 
 
 
 
